Recently, a new chapter was started in the handbook of terror involving the application of nerve gas technology to the killing of civilians. On March 19, a terrorist attack in a Tokyo subway resulted in the loss of 10 lives and injury to over 5,000 others. In view of the lethality of the suspected agent, sarin, the fatalities were surprisingly few. Terrorist attacks on civilians are not new, but what was unique about this particular attack was the use of a nerve agent instead of the customary conventional weapons. The possibility that nerve agents can be used against a vulnerable civilian population is alarming. A new era has begun, and we would be remiss if we did not learn from this one attack and take steps to prepare for the next. There is no doubt that those involved in the use of terror will learn from their mistakes and become more effective in their deployment of these horrific weapons.
From a public perspective there are several questions that must be urgently addressed. What can we do to prevent such attacks and how do we respond if such an attack should occur? Can we prevent terrorist organizations from making nerve agents? How do we prevent them from delivering these agents to their targets? Is there anything that we as a society can do to protect ourselves in the event of a gas attack? How do we minimize our vulnerability? How do we respond to an attack? All of these questions are very difficult to answer.
Agents like GB (sarin), GA (tabun), and VX are easily synthesized; however, handling, storage, and delivery of these agents is not quite so simple. Knowledge for performing these tasks is commonplace, and I suspect that any third-year chemistry student could design and build a facility for their production. Clearly, we cannot restrict access to information. Chemical &-Engineering News responded to the March 19 attack by showing the reader how easy it is to synthesize sarin from dimethylmethylphosphonate (1) . The information is in the textbooks, and like most technical information, the methodology for the production of nerve gases is not controllable, even if one wanted to.
Nerve gases are highly toxic organophosphate esters chemically similar to the organophosphate pesticides but with substantially higher acute toxicities. For example, the LD50 (mg/kg) for rats via dermal exposures is only 0.1 for VX, 2.5 for GB (sarin), but 6.8 for the pesticide parathion, 4,000 for sevin, and 4,400 for malathion (2) . In comparison, for humans the estimated dermal LD50 values for VX, GB, and GA are about 0.09, 24, and 18 mg/kg, respectively (2) .
Could the raw materials involved in the manufacture of organophosphates be regulated and controlled as a means of preventing terrorist organizations from synthesizing nerve agents? Unfortunately, the starting materials are very common and easily obtained. As pointed out in Nature (3) There are several reasonably effective antidotes to nerve gases. GB, GA, and VX are all organophosphates that, like their less toxic pesticide cousins, inhibit acetylcholinesterase, resulting in the accumulation of acetylcholine at the nerve synapses. Accumulation of acetylcholine results in the overstimulation of parts of the nervous system that control smooth muscle, cardiac muscle, and exocrine glandular function. In general, death results from respiratory failure. Several agents can antagonize the accumulation of acetylcholine. Atropine when used in conjunction with oximes such as pralidoxime, obidoxime, or trimedoxime (4) may prevent and reverse, to a degree, the central nervous system effects of the nerve gases. The problem is that atropine and the oximes are themselves highly toxic and they should be administered to a victim of a gas attack only by trained personnel (4). It would not be possible for the general population to carry such toxic agents and to self-administer them in the event of a gas attack. In addition, nerve gas exposure could result in mental confusion, dizziness, nausea, and vomiting, and self-administration under such circumstances would be highly risky.
It is unlikely that, in the event of a terrorist attack on a civilian population, emergency personnel could respond with appropriate equipment and antidotes in less than 30 minutes, even if antidotes and other materials were available in the quantities projected. With agents that can kill in seconds, 30 minutes after the gas is in the air is too late. In view of the complexities involved, it seems unlikely that an attack on civilian lives in a crowded public place could be prevented. However, we can act to minimize casualties which are to a degree determined by the nature of our responses and the speed with which they are put in place. Emergency and medical personnel, especially those in cities where large numbers of people congregate at certain times, should be trained to deal with terrorist attacks involving nerve agents. Such personnel should have on hand substances that might limit the toxicity of nerve and/or blistering agents in sufficient quantities to treat thousands of people. Equipment and protective clothing for emergency and medical personnel should also be available.
One approach that might help reduce the number of casualties in the event of gas attacks in crowded public buildings involves the use of sprinkler systems. GB, GA, and VX are all miscible with water (2), and washing with weakly alkaline solutions is part of the protocol established by the military for the decontamination of personnel exposed to nerve gases (4) . Most public buildings in the United States have sprinkler systems installed in the event of fire. Perhaps sprinklers could be deployed almost immediately as a means of confining the released gas and reducing its concentration. In the absence of decontamination kits, washing with copious amounts of water or weak alkaline solutions could remove the nerve agent or at least reduce its concentration in the air.
Suppose that a room containing 1,000 people, were exposed to an air concentration of nerve gas sufficiently high to transfer a dose of agent to each of the occupants equal to the LD50, then 500 of Environmental Health Perspectives
unlikely that a sprinkler system could remove nerve gas from the air with 100% efficiency, but many lives might be saved even with only partial removal of the gas. Experiments could easily be designed to test the hypothesis and with appropriate modifications to sprinkler systems, perhaps involving flow rates and droplet sizes, rendered optimally effective in removing toxic agents from the air. In addition, sprinkler systems could be coupled with nerve gas detectors such as the time-of-flight mass spectrometers currently under development at Johns Hopkins or the surface acoustic wave sensors currently being developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and thereby reduce the response time possibly to within seconds of the initial gas release.
It seems reasonable to suppose that if nerve gas attacks in crowded, enclosed spaces could be blunted through use of sprinkler systeams coupled with specific detection devices, then the presence of such a system might, itself, be a major deterrent. After all, there would be little point in carrying out an attack if its chances of success were substantially reduced.
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The XIVth World Congress on Occupational Safety and Health will be held in Madrid from April 22 to April 26, 1996. The organizers are the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Security, through the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (INSHT), the International Labour Office (ILO), Geneva, and the International Social Security Association (ISSA), Geneva. These World Congresses, of which the first was held in Rome in 1955 and the last in New Delhi in 1993, have had such venues as Brussels, Paris, London, Zagreb, Vienna, Dublin, Bucharest, Amsterdam, Ottawa, Stockholm and Hamburg. The XIVth World Congress, to be held in Madrid, aims to be an open forum for all persons involved in risk prevention at work, safety and health safety specialists, occupational health physicians, labour inspectors, persons directly concerned with safety and health at work, including entrepreneurs and managers in enterprises, trade union representatives, manufacturers and importers, as well as heads of public administration and social security administrators. The main focus of this Congress will be on the consequences for occupational safety and health of processes of international and regional integration (e.g. EU, NAFTA) and of the globalization of economic relations, on an in-depth analysis of chemical risks and on new proposals for cooperation and participation within enterprises. Other specific issues will also be dealt with, such as training and information, control of working conditions or new responsibilities. Special emphasis will be placed on small and medium-sized enterprises and sectors facing specific problems with regard to safety and health at work, such as the construction sector and agriculture. In addition, as part of this Congress, the International Section "Electricity" of the ISSA will be organizing the 3rd 
